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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Did Voir Dire and Discovery Restrictions Justify the Grant of a New
Sentencing Hearing to the Man Convicted of the Boston Marathon Bombing?

CASE AT A GLANCE
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was sentenced to death after a federal jury trial on numerous counts
arising from the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. He and his brother, Tamerlan, carried
out the bombing, which killed 3 people and injured more than 200 others. Because Tamerlan
died while resisting arrest, only Dzhokhar was tried for the crimes. On appeal, the First
Circuit affirmed 27 of the 30 convictions but vacated the death sentences and remanded
for a new sentencing hearing, after finding two errors. One concerned jury questioning, or
voir dire; the trial court asked the prospective jurors if the information they heard before
trial about the crimes would prevent them from being impartial jurors but refused the
defendant’s request to ask them to indicate precisely what they had learned from media
sources. The other was that the trial court refused to allow discovery regarding an unrelated
crime allegedly committed by Tamerlan and another person two years earlier. Dzhokhar did
not contest his guilt but sought the information about the earlier crime in support of his
theory that Tamerlan was the principal actor in all the crimes and dominated others to obey
him to commit crimes, which should be a mitigating factor in his brother’s sentencing.
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Introduction

appropriate sentence. In the latter proceeding, mitigating
and aggravating evidence is presented to justify the level
of punishment a jury will recommend or impose. If
convicted, the defendant in a capital case must be allowed
to offer mitigating evidence in a sentencing hearing.
Trial courts have discretion in determining whether the
evidence offered to reduce defendant’s culpability has
probative value that outweighs the possibility of unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.

To eliminate possible bias, potential jurors complete a
written questionnaire and are questioned in open court,
by either the judge, the parties, or both, during a process
called voir dire. Trial courts have broad discretion in
how voir dire is conducted. Jurors may be excused from
participation if their similar life experiences, opinions, or
exposure to prejudicial information prevent them from
being impartial. A juror may be excused for cause or by a
peremptory strike utilized by one of the parties.

Issues

In death penalty cases, there is a bifurcated trial—first as
to guilt or innocence, and second, if convicted, as to the
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

1. Did the court of appeals err in concluding that
respondent’s capital sentences must be vacated on the
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ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir
dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific
accounting of the pretrial media coverage that they had
read, heard, or seen about respondent’s case?

A federal grand jury charged Tsarnaev with 30 offenses,
including 17 capital counts. During pretrial proceedings,
he filed two motions for a change of venue based on the
extraordinary publicity. In denying the motion, the district
court stated that “juror impartiality does not require
ignorance.” The appellate court affirmed that ruling in a
pretrial appeal, and jury selection began in January of 2015.

2. Did the district court commit reversible error at
the penalty phase of respondent’s trial by excluding
evidence that respondent’s older brother was allegedly
involved in different crimes two years before the
offenses for which respondent was convicted?

The pool of potential jurors included 1,300 people, who
then completed a questionnaire on their backgrounds,
exposure to publicity, views on the death penalty, and
opinions of the defendant. Question 77 of the juror
questionnaire asked potential jurors whether, because
of what they had seen or read in the news media, they
had formed an opinion that Tsarnaev was guilty, or
whether he should receive the death penalty. It went on
to ask if the potential juror could set aside any opinion
and decide about guilt and punishment solely on the
evidence presented in court. The district court declined
the defendant’s request to add a question asking potential
jurors to list what they knew about the case, explaining
that this would create unmanageable amounts of data.

Facts
On April 15, 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother,
Tamerlan, set off two shrapnel bombs near the finish
line of the Boston Marathon, causing three deaths and
hundreds of injuries. In the days following the attack,
the FBI released surveillance-camera images of the
bombing suspects. Reports of the attack and its aftermath
constantly flashed across TV, computer, and smartphone
screens throughout the country. Residents of Boston and
surrounding communities were asked to stay home while
the suspects remained at large.
Three days after the bombing, the defendant and Tamerlan
shot and killed a Massachusetts Institute of Technology
campus security officer before carjacking a bystander and
fleeing in an SUV. The brothers held the driver hostage
until he fled the car at a gas station and phoned the police.
The SUV’s navigation system was tracked to a neighboring
community, and authorities engaged in a firefight. The
defendant drove toward the police officers and struck
Tamerlan, who died hours later.

After reviewing the questionnaires, the district court called
back 256 prospective jurors. The voir dire took 21 days. Both
parties were allowed to question the prospective jurors;
however, the district court denied Tsarnaev’s multiple
requests to ask each prospective juror about what stood out
in his or her mind from everything he or she might have
“heard, read, or seen about the Boston Marathon bombing
and the events that followed it.”
Numerous prospective jurors were dismissed by the court
for cause, but none of the dismissals were related to the
questions that Tsarnaev sought to ask. Two jurors were
seated despite the defense discovering that their social
media postings were arguably inconsistent with their
answers during voir dire. One juror denied making any
posts about the case, but in fact posted 22 times, including
calling Tsarnaev a “piece of garbage.” Another juror
described the jury selection process on Facebook and
was told by a friend to “play the part” to get on the jury to
send Tsarnaev to prison, where he “will be taken care of.”
A third motion for a change of venue was denied, and the
appellate court affirmed the ruling.

Tsarnaev escaped and hid in a neighborhood outside of
Boston until the police captured him. While in hiding, he
wrote a manifesto, explaining that his actions were a result
of the United States “killing our innocent civilians” and
that “he could not stand to see this evil go unpunished.”
The investigation revealed Tsarnaev often visited al-Qaeda
and other similar websites.
The media coverage, both traditional and social, of the
bombing stands unrivaled in American legal history. The
events of the bombing and subsequent capture flashed on
every TV screen in the country, including information that
was later ruled inadmissible at trial, such as the defendant’s
involuntary confession and statements from Boston’s
mayor and the families of victims. Boston’s mayor publicly
stated that Tsarnaev should get the death penalty. He was
called “evil,” a “monster,” “depraved,” “vile,” a “scumbag,”
and even the “devil” on various forms of media.
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

Further, in pretrial proceedings, the defendant sought to
compel discovery about the investigation of an unsolved
triple homicide that occurred in Waltham, Massachusetts,
in 2011. Investigators suspected Tamerlan’s friend of
involvement. The friend later admitted to the crime,
39
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Case Analysis

but explained that Tamerlan was the one who killed the
witnesses of their robbery. This friend began writing a
confession, but then attacked the investigators, who shot
and killed him before the confession was complete.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
require that criminal trials must be conducted fairly
before an impartial jury based on the evidence produced
in court. For over a century, the Supreme Court has
protected juror impartiality, finding that our trial system
rests on conclusions that are drawn from evidence and
argument in open court and that are not affected by
any outside influence. Although it is not required that
venirepersons be ignorant of the facts and issues involved
in the case, it is required that the jurors are unbiased and
impartial.

Tsarnaev was informed of the fact and general substance
of the statements but was not provided with the reports
or recordings from the investigation. The district court
denied his motions to compel discovery and granted the
government’s motion to exclude the Waltham murder
evidence from the penalty phase of the trial. The defendant
sought to offer the Waltham crimes as mitigating evidence
in the punishment phase of the trial to support his theory
that he was following Tamerlan’s strong lead and that,
because he was not the mastermind behind the bombings,
he should get the lesser sentence of life imprisonment.

When a criminal defendant has been the subject of
extensive pretrial publicity, the need for action by the
trial court is apparent. The Supreme Court in Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), held that there is a
duty assigned to trial judges to take steps to reduce the
potential prejudice and that failure to do so can result in
a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Thus,
due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an
impartial jury free from outside influences. Trial judges
should utilize available tools to diminish the effects of the
prejudicial publicity, which includes granting a change of
venue or sequestering the jury.

After the jury found the defendant guilty on all 30 counts,
it recommended capital punishment for 6 of the capital
offenses, life imprisonment on the remaining capital
offenses, and several concurrent and consecutive terms
on the remaining 13 offenses. The district court imposed
the punishments as recommended. The court denied a
posttrial motion for acquittal or a new trial, again rejecting
concerns over the venue of the trial.
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed judgments for
27 of the 30 counts but vacated the capital sentences
and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding on the
grounds that the district court abused its discretion when
it denied Tsarnaev the chance to ask questions about the
pretrial publicity. United States v. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24 (1st
Cir. 2020). Also, the court found that denial of discovery
and introduction of the Waltham evidence was reversible
error, as the government did not show that it would not
have convinced even one juror that Tsarnaev did not bear
the same moral culpability as his brother. Finally, the court
held that the refusal to order disclosure of the reports and
recordings of the confession violated Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), in that the evidence was favorable to
the defendant and there was a reasonable probability that
the Waltham evidence’s disclosure would have produced a
different penalty-phase result. It did not rule on the issues
surrounding claimed violations of Tsarnaev’s Fifth, Sixth,
and Eighth Amendment rights, which possibly occurred
when the two jurors who did not disclose about their
social media use were seated.

Voir dire safeguards the defendant’s constitutional rights
and allows exploration of potential biases in prospective
juries. It has long played a critical function in empaneling
impartial jurors. Without an adequate voir dire, the
defense cannot develop bases for making challenges
and the trial judge cannot fulfill the duty of removing
prospective jurors who will not be able to impartially
follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence.
In determining whether the district court erred in
prohibiting Tsarnaev from asking questions about what
the venireperson has seen, read, or heard about the case,
the important precedent discussed by the parties are
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991), Skilling v. United
States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), and a First Circuit opinion,
Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1968).
In Mu’Min, the defendant was convicted of murder, and
his motion for a change of venue was denied despite
submitting dozens of local newspaper articles discussing
prejudicial information. During voir dire, 8 of the 12
jurors indicated they had media exposure to the case;
however, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that this violated the defendant’s due process and Sixth
Amendment rights. Mu’Min recognized that state and

The government sought review by the Supreme Court to
reverse the First Circuit ruling and to reinstate the death
penalties. The Court granted certiorari on March 22, 2021.
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases
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federal court judges have wide discretion in deciding
which questions should be asked during voir dire and that
the Sixth Amendment does not require questions on what
information the potential juror was exposed to. But the
Court made clear that federal courts can set the standards
for voir dire and that these types of questions could prove
helpful—even desirable from the viewpoint of sound
judicial practice.

v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978), and Silverthorne v.
United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968). The Third
Circuit expressly invoked its supervisory power and
required district courts to ask content-specific questions in
cases involving “a significant possibility that [prospective
jurors] will be ineligible to serve because of exposure to
potentially prejudicial material.”
Similarly, in United States v. Dellinger, 472 F2d. 340 (7th
Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit held that inquiry into a
juror’s past is necessary in some circumstances. On the
other side, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this position in
United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733 (1985), finding
that voir dire can be adequate without questioning
into the details of what information the juror has been
exposed to.

Skilling held that identifying impartial prospective jurors
is “particularly within the province of the trial judge,” who
“sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had
its effect,” observes prospective jurors up close, and can
adopt tailored measures to detect and eliminate bias. The
defendant in Skilling was a longtime chief executive officer
of Enron, an energy-trading and utility company, who
sought a change of venue after hundreds of news reports
detailed the company’s downfall, his bankruptcy, and his
negative reputation in the community.

In seeking to have Tsarnaev’s sentences reinstated, the
government relies on Mu’Min’s core concept that trial
courts are not required to ask prospective jurors about
the specific contents of the news reports to which they
have been exposed. It points out that neither the defense
nor the appellate court mentioned Patriarca during the
pretrial proceedings. The government focuses on Skilling
to emphasize its point that jurors may serve as long as they
can lay aside their impressions or opinions and render a
verdict based on the evidence presented in court.

The rulings in Mu’Min and Skilling are important
precedent, but they do not squarely answer the question
asked here. The First Circuit relied on its precedent,
Patriarca, in holding that where the trial judge finds “‘a
significant possibility that jurors have been exposed to
potentially prejudicial material,’” the judge, “on request
of counsel,” should examine each venireperson to elicit
the kind and degree of their exposure to the case or the
parties. When the district court failed to do so here,
especially given the immense media coverage of this case,
it had impermissibly delegated to potential jurors the
work of judging their own impartiality. Thus, the rule
derived from Patriarca is that content-specific questioning
is required in high-profile cases when the court finds
a significant possibility that potential jurors have been
exposed to potentially prejudicial material, and the First
Circuit utilized its supervisory power to enforce the
rule. Because Tsarnaev admitted that he committed the
crimes, the error affected only the sentencing but not the
determination of guilt.

The government details the ways that prospective jurors
were asked about their exposure to prejudicial pretrial
publicity. Question 77 asked about the types of media
consumed, if prospective jurors had “a little,” “moderate,”
or “a lot” of exposure; the questionnaire also asked about
the venireperson’s assessment of the defendant’s guilt. The
government argues that the trial court did everything it
was supposed to do to identify potential biases and explore
whether it would prevent the venireperson from being fair
and impartial under applicable Supreme Court precedent.
On the other hand, Tsarnaev argues that Mu’Min offers
the opportunity for federal courts to enforce rules that
do more than what was done in that case and that circuit
courts may enforce supervisory rules so long as they do
not conflict with constitutional or statutory provisions and
represent reasoned exercises of authority. Thus, he argues
that in a sound exercise of supervisory power, the First
Circuit correctly vacated the death penalties and remanded
for a new sentencing proceeding because the district court
violated the principle spelled out in Patriarca.

Since 1968, the First Circuit has used Patriarca to evaluate
a district court’s use of voir dire in highly publicized trials,
including United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1985), United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1988),
and United States v. Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d 33 (1st Cir.
2000). The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have similarly
held that district courts should independently investigate
the potential bias of jurors when there is a significant
possibility of pretrial prejudice through publicity in United
States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), United States
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

Tsarnaev argues that more thorough questioning into the
specifics of pretrial exposure only benefits the parties and
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the court in providing additional opportunities to reveal
biases in prospective jurors. Illustratively, the defendant
says that questioning into pretrial media exposure in
this case could have revealed the inaccurate statements
told by two of the seated jurors to the court. Instead, the
defense found out about the jurors’ social media postings
from their own research, and the trial court allowed the
jurors to remain on the venire when they stated they could
remain impartial. In this case, because of unprecedented
media exposure, Tsarnaev states that questioning into
the specifics of pretrial media exposure was necessary to
safeguard his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury.

of killing a police officer, wanted to offer mitigating
evidence that he had serious emotional disturbance.
Because the trial court refused to allow any mitigating
evidence other than the defendant’s age, the sentence
was vacated.
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), quotes Eddings
and offers a corollary rule that the sentencer may not
refuse to consider or be precluded from considering any
relevant mitigation evidence. There, the trial court erred
when it did not accept the criminal defendant’s postarrest good behavior as a mitigating factor. Both state and
federal courts have not read this rule to be a limitation on
the statutorily given discretion found in Section 3593(c),
and instead, continue to exercise discretion in excluding
marginally probative or unreliable evidence.

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides
that capital defendants must be permitted to introduce
evidence relevant to any mitigating factors. For half
a century, since Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
the judicious and careful use of the death penalty has
been constitutional. This method requires a bifurcated
proceeding in which the trial and sentencing are
conducted separately.

In determining whether the refusal to admit the mitigating
evidence surrounding the Waltham murders was error,
the parties cite some of the same authority, but ultimately
rely on the facts of Tsarnaev’s sentencing proceeding for
their analysis.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 3593(c), a capital defendant “may
present any information relevant to a mitigating factor.”
Relevant mitigating evidence “tends logically to prove or
disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder
could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.” Tennard
v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004). The proposed mitigating
evidence does not need to meet admissibility under the
rules of evidence; this broad standard reflects the idea
that punishment should be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal defendant. Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002).

The district court instructed the jury to consider several
mitigating factors relating to Tamerlan’s conduct and
his influence over the defendant: whether, because of
Tamerlan’s “aggressiveness,” the defendant was susceptible
to his older brother’s influence; whether Tamerlan planned
and directed the bombing; and whether the defendant
had acted under Tamerlan’s influence. The district court
did not allow in or compel discovery on the Waltham
murders because it deemed the information as lacking
any probative value and requiring a confusing minitrial.
The appellate court reversed—finding that the Waltham
evidence was not only relevant but highly probative of the
defense’s theory that Tsarnaev was under the influence of
his brother, and that his brother was the mastermind not
only of the bombing but of his previous crimes.

The Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be able to
consider and give effect to a capital defendant’s mitigating
evidence. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
However, a judge may exclude proposed mitigating
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger
of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury under Section 3593(c). The sentencing
proceeding is not a mechanism to introduce any and
all evidence that a party wishes, and an appellate court
reviews the trial court’s application of the standard for an
abuse of discretion.

The government argues that the denial was squarely
within the trial court’s discretion under Section 3593(c)
and the Supreme Court should reinstate the district
court’s sentences. The government acknowledges that
the standard for determining probative value is lower for
mitigating evidence than it is for other evidence under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403; however, the Waltham
evidence would have required a “confusing minitrial,”
and the value of the evidence does not overcome this
harm. Further, because the district court allowed in other
evidence that supports the defense’s theory that Tamerlan
was the aggressive mastermind behind the bombing, the

In Eddings, the Court made clear that a death sentence
cannot be imposed without the type of individualized
consideration of mitigating factors required by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases.
There, the criminal defendant, a 16-year-old found guilty
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases
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government argues the Waltham evidence has even less
probative value under Section 3593(c).

The Court may acknowledge the supervisory power
that the First Circuit utilized considering the dicta in
Mu’Min, explaining how content-specific questioning
during voir dire can be helpful. It is undeniable that the
media landscape has experienced significant changes in
the past century. Because access to media is no longer
limited to local and national news reports, newspapers,
or word-of-mouth, and a local judge can no longer
know the media outlets that a potential juror may have
encountered, the Court may accept Mu’Min’s position that
federal courts can create higher standards for voir dire,
especially in high-profile cases. As media regarding any
trial becomes more widely available to everyday citizens,
this ruling would allow flexibility in the review of jury
selection procedures.

By emphasizing that Tamerlan made a rash decision to
kill the witnesses in Waltham—a completely different
circumstance than the thoroughly planned bombing in
Boston—the government argues that this evidence would
confuse and unnecessarily lead the jury to determine
Tamerlan’s guilt for an unsolved and unrelated crime.
Conversely, the defendant asserts that the appellate
court correctly held that the trial court abused its
discretion because the confession by Tamerlan’s friend
was reliable. He points to the fact that the federal
government concluded the confession was sufficiently
reliable to support a search warrant affidavit. Further,
the defendant argues that the district court could have
allowed the evidence to be introduced by admitting only
the search warrant affidavit, bypassing the “confusing
minitrial” the government warned of and limiting
possible distractions.

On the other hand, Mu’Min’s core principles and the
ruling in Skilling may guide the Court to reject the First
Circuit’s application of Patriarca. No Supreme Court
precedent requires that jurors be asked about the specific
contents of their media exposure. The precautions taken
by the district court in the present case may be sufficient
under precedent. If so, the trial court did not commit
reversible error by not requiring questions into the
venirepersons’ specific pretrial media exposure.

Counter to the government’s argument that the inclusion
of some evidence on Tamerlan’s aggressiveness decreases
the probative value of the Waltham evidence, the
defendant argues that the denial is irreconcilable with the
court’s other admissions. Evidence that Tamerlan yelled at
a butcher, poked a man in the chest, and possibly abused
his girlfriend was admitted. The defendant argues that
these small instances are similar to the Waltham murders,
except that the Waltham murders show Tamerlan was a
violent criminal, not just a rude customer or aggressive
person. Thus, Tsarnaev states the evidence is probative to
show that Tamerlan bullied him into participating in the
bombings like he bullied his friend into participating in
the Waltham murders. Without the evidence of Tamerlan’s
ability to influence others, Tsarnaev argues that the
government was able to paint a misleading portrait of a
“bossy older brother,” and not a violent criminal.

Turning to the issue of the Waltham evidence, the Court
may find that the trial court acted within its discretion
under Section 3593(c) in finding that the probative value
did not outweigh the concerns that the evidence would
lead to more confusion. If so, the trial court ruling will
be upheld. However, if the Supreme Court agrees that the
evidence was improperly excluded under Section 3593(c),
the Court must then determine if the abuse of discretion
constituted reversible error. The Court will not reverse if
the government meets the burden of showing that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, in that Tsarnaev
would have been sentenced to death regardless of the error.
If the Supreme Court affirms the appellate decision
on either or both grounds, Tsarnaev will have a new
sentencing hearing to determine if he will be executed or
if he will be incarcerated for life. If the Court reverses, the
original death sentences will be reinstated.

Significance
The decision in this case may be important in determining
the level of questioning necessary in the jury selection of
high-profile cases and whether the lack of questioning
into a juror’s pretrial media exposure is a violation of the
supervisory rule that the First Circuit set out more than a
half century ago in Patriarca. It is important to note that
even if the Court affirms the First Circuit, the jury at a
new sentencing hearing could again recommend a death
sentence for Tsarnaev.

PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

This appeal involves important issues surrounding jury
selection in high-profile cases. To what extent will
modern technology and the heightened level of media
exposure people face in their daily lives affect the standard
for questioning in voir dire? Was relevant mitigation
evidence improperly kept from the jury in this case?
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